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Abstract 
When business processes depend on the processing 
capabilities within a data center, the typical system 
architecture use a high-availability setup to maintain a 
high level of service. Faced with a specific machine-to-
machine system consisting of many endpoints that 
collect and forward data to the data center we argue 
that the dependability of the overall system does not 
necessitate a high level of service for the data center 
components. Taking an existing discrete event 
simulation model of a distributed technical system we 
investigate and discuss the effects of prolonged outages 
of the data center on the major business processes of 
the system. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The value chain [1] perspective emphasizes those 
activities that contribute directly to the product and the 
firms’ profit. Beyond these primary activities a 
sizeable number of support activities contribute 
indirectly. However, one support activity – the day-to-
day operations of the information systems – is de facto 
already part of every primary activity: Business 
processes need information and information systems to 
run efficiently and to sustain a competitive advantage 
[2]. 
In a software-intensive world business processes 
depend – in the sense of [3] – on the information 
processing where dependability has five major 
attributes: availability, reliability, safety, integrity and 
maintainability. In this article we focus on two 
attributes, availability and reliability, to discuss their 
effects on the architecture of information systems.  
The starting point for our investigation is an 
existing distributed machine-to-machine system, the 
German automatic toll system. This system collects the 
tolls from heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) driving on 
federal toll roads in Germany (for more details see e.g. 
[4] and references therein). About 90% of the tolls are 
collected automatically by the more than 950000 on-
board-units deployed in the HGVs (upper part in figure 
1), for the remainder the users choose either a manual 
log-on at a toll station terminal or the internet log-on to 
pay the tolls for a planned route in advance. The toll 
system collects a total of ~ 4.4 bn € annually [5] and is 
an example for a liability-critical system, i.e. errors 
may directly result in financial damages. 
In the next section we describe the typical steps 
undertaken to achieve a high level of service – 
predominantly in the backend systems. Section 3 takes 
the point of view of the end-to-end processing in the 
case of the automatic toll collection. We argue that the 
machine-to-machine system can leverage the 
distributed clients, i.e. the OBUs in the toll system 
example, to achieve dependability. To that extent 
section 4 describes a sequence of simulation runs 
where the backend systems are offline for increasing 
periods of time. During the offline period the OBUs 
buffer the data and start transmitting once the backend 
systems become available. The accuracy of the 
simulation results depends (among other things) on the 
statistics used in modeling the user behavior. Section 5 
 
 
Figure 1: High-level architecture of the toll 
system with a fully automatic mode using 
OBUs and a manual log-on via internet or toll 
station terminals 
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discusses these statistics and compares the simulation 
model with observations from the real-world system. 
 
2. Achieving a high level of service  
 
The main purpose of a software-intensive system is 
to render a service – either for a person or to another 
technical system. In the generic terms of [3] the service 
is the systems’ behavior as perceived by the users in 
terms of what the system is intended to do. This 
definition allows for a degree of recursiveness: Figure 
1 could be read as showing a single system, i.e. the 
high-level architecture of the German toll system, or 
many loosely connected systems interacting with each 
other. 
These opposite views of what constitutes a ‘system’ 
lead to different conclusions when discussing non-
functional requirements [6], e.g. expressed as 
constraints (e.g. regarding the interfaces, performance, 
operations, life-cycle or software economics [7]): Who 
or what depends on the correct functioning of the 
system? The generic answer should include a specific 
requirement, e.g. concerning the quality of the service 
[8]. Looking back at [3] the quality of the service could 
be described amongst others in the terms of availability 
and reliability:  
 Is the service supposedly rendered by the system 
available? 
 Does the system provide the correct service 
continuously? 
The latter question is the topic of section 4.2 where 
we discuss the quality attributes reliability and integrity 
for the period of resuming normal operations after a 
prolonged unavailability of the central system. The 
answer to the first question is usually given as a metric 
measuring the availability of the service. However, the 
metric depends on the point-of-view: If the system is 
seen as a system-of-systems, i.e. each block in figure 1 
constitutes a separate system; the availability is defined 
and measured for each system on its own. This 
approach readily leads to very high demands on the 
availability of systems. An example is given in figure 2 
where two systems A and B follow the same 
architecture using a (simplified) layer model. When 
application B is seen as rendering a service for 
application A, the availability should be measured at 
the application-level of system B. 
A simple assumption for the availability of an 
application stack as depicted in figure 2 is the “and” 
combination of the component availabilities: The 
hardware with its data center surroundings must be 
operational, the operating system the data persistence 
layer and the application itself running to render the 
service of a single system. One consequence could be 
to raise the availability of each component: The data 
center can be built without single-point-of-failures, e.g. 
up to multiple active power and cooling paths in a 
Tier-IV data center [9], [10] yielding a site availability 
of > 99.99%, server and storage hardware with internal 
error detection and recovery and support staff on-site 
around the clock. Increasing the availability even 
further requires the duplication of the system under 
consideration. When a fault occurs either in the soft- or 
hardware the system switches to the replica and 
continues operating. In that way many (but not all) 
faults can be hidden [11] – increasing the time-to-
failure and reducing the time-to-repair. 
Increasing the requirements for the availability of 
each system the cost of operations shows a 
disproportionate increase. Over the past decade novel 
IS operators started to offer cloud computing where 
some functionality partakes in existing very large 
installations with massive redundancy (e.g. [12]). 
Looking at the toll system example at least some 
systems offer themselves for a cloud solution, e.g. the 
internet log-on system or the systems receiving the toll 
data and providing updates to the OBU fleet. Other 
systems, e.g. the large-scale billing application, might 
not yet be ready to transition to a cloud provider – with 
availability and business continuity listed as a primary 
obstacle [13]. 
Returning to the toll system example from figure 1 
the emphasis on the availability of sub-systems is at 
least in parts misleading: These systems are either 
sourced from business partners or physically deployed 
in the HGVs. Therefore the next section shifts the 
focus to discuss availability along the complete 
business process of collecting tolls. 
 
 
Figure 2: Stylized layer model of two 
application stacks A and B rendering a 
service at a given quality. 
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 3. End-to-end processing 
 
Looking at the toll system as a single system 
rendering the service of collecting the tolls due for 
driving on German federal toll roads the attribute 
availability could be defined for the end-to-end 
processing of the tolls. This perspective takes a large 
part of the value chain (see figure 3) – generating toll 
data through the use of OBUs, transmission of toll data 
to the centrals system and download of updates to the 
OBUs – to define the service rendered to the user, i.e. 
the HGVs' driver. Apart from power-cycling the OBUs 
the automatic toll system does not require user 
interaction, i.e. it is a machine-to-machine system. In 
that respect we suggest to use the metric POFOD 
(probability of failure on demand), the proportion of 
the overall fleet where OBUs are no longer able to 
generate new toll data. When this happens the OBU 
signals its unavailability to the user and the user is 
required to participate in the manual or internet log-on 
instead. Different reasons can trigger this situation: 
The local storage space is exhausted, domain-specific 
limitations are reached (e.g. the maximum time period 
without successful communication or the credit 
implied by the stored toll data). These triggers depend 
only on the usage of a specific OBU – in that sense 
there is no fleet-wide failure mode, the high-
availability is inherent in the usage of independent 
OBUs. Of course, the possibility of system-wide 
software faults exists and must be addressed by other 
means.  
As long as the sub-systems are loosely coupled, the 
components can hide periods of unavailability: Neither 
the billing process nor the update process is required to 
run in real-time (for the typical time scales see figure 3, 
lower part). Similar to telco operations, the billing 
cycle typically operates on a monthly basis, updates of 
geo and map data take days to weeks to propagate 
across the OBU fleet. Toll data is of course generated 
in direct proportion to the HGV driving at a time scale 
of seconds or minutes – as toll events while on a toll 
road in the case of a thick-client OBU or as positional 
data for subsequent processing in the central system in 
the case of a thin-client OBU. 
Following this approach the metric for the systems' 
availability is the proportion of the OBUs that are 
powered on and signal ‘out-of-service’ to the driver. 
Anything leading up to this unavailability corresponds 
at most to delayed processing – toll data needs more 
time to arrive in the data center and is therefore 
included only on future bills. It has to be assumed that 
the operator of the toll system is required to finance the 
delayed processing, i.e. the typical amount of tolls 
needs to be transferred to the German federal 
government in time and can only be recovered from the 
users when the billing process has caught up with the 
data backlog. In addition to the cost of financing the 
operator is assumed to bear the risk of default on the 
side of its users, i.e. over time some users become 
unable to pay past tolls.  
 
4. Simulation setup and results  
 
To investigate the attribute availability from an 
end-to-end perspective we use an existing realistic 
discrete event simulation model of the German 
automatic toll system [14]. To measure the POFOD 
metric we enhance the OBU logic in the simulation 
model to include different triggers for the OBU to 
signal its unavailability. The most important trigger is 
the exhaustion of the storage space reserved for toll 
data – a fleet-wide parameter that we discuss in section 
4.1 in more detail. Another trigger in a thick-client 
 
 
Figure 3: The value chain of the automatic toll system and the typical time scales of automatic 
processes. The simulation model includes an abstraction of the OBU processes, the data 
transmission and the servers receiving and storing the toll data. 
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OBU is the validity of the OBUs' geo and map data. In 
this article we assume that the server providing updates 
remains available at all times and as a consequence the 
validity of the local data is a negligible trigger for 
OBUs to be out-of-service. However, at the end of a 
fleet-wide update when the new map and geo data 
becomes valid, those OBUs that were unable to fetch 
the update in advance will be out-of-service until the 
update is successfully downloaded and applied.  
In addition to the OBU-logic we added the data 
mining capabilities to the simulation model to measure 
the fleet-wide percentage of OBUs that are out-of-
service in two different ways: 
 Counting all OBUs even when they are powered 
off or not within the reach of the German mobile 
data networks or  
 taking only the active OBUs (powered-on and in 
Germany) into account. 
The latter is close to the POFOD metric, i.e. it is the 
percentage of OBUs signaling the driver that the OBU 
is out-of-service. While the driver will perceive this as 
outage, the real metric would be lower since HGVs 
spend only ~ 50% of their driving time on toll roads.  
The users’ perspective expressed with the POFOD 
metric is an emergent property of the whole socio-
technical system: “[…] that which cannot be predicted 
through analysis at any level simpler than that of the 
system as a whole” [15]. To investigate the effects of 
server outages on the automatic toll collection we set 
up a series of simulation runs (see figure 4) where the 
server receiving toll data is unreachable for 1 to 10 
days consecutively starting with the Saturday at the 
end of the third week in the simulation run. The – 
seemingly arbitrary – choice of 10 days is motivated by 
an outage starting on a weekend and running into a 
week with public holidays (e.g. on Friday and Monday 
on a Easter weekend in Germany) where the access to 
personnel would typically be restricted. 
Simulation runs for this scenario are repeated for 
different sizes of the buffer allotted on the OBUs for 
storing toll data. The simulation runs include another 
two weeks after the service is restored to observe the 
return to normal operations. In any other respect we 
use the existing realistic simulation model without 
alteration: The size of the OBU fleet is 900 000, OBUs 
lose their network connectivity briefly and frequently, 
resource restrictions apply as in the real-world system. 
Besides the server receiving the toll data no other 
component has any outages in the simulation run. 
 
4.1 Mitigating outages 
 
Under normal operating conditions the OBUs are 
far from signaling ‘out-of-service’: Toll data is 
buffered and there is ample space and time available to 
hide brief technical outages, e.g. of the mobile data 
network or the backend system. Map and geo data is 
distributed in advance so that only those few OBUs 
that were offline for several weeks need to fetch an 
update immediately after powering on or returning to 
Germany. In this scenario OBUs buffer only enough 
data to allow for efficient technical processes, e.g. 
considering the server load in the central system and 
the network characteristics. In effect the buffer holds 
only a small amount of data under normal operating 
conditions (normalized as 1 in figure 5). 
With the onset of the 10-day period of the toll data 
server unavailability toll data can no longer be sent 
from the OBUs to the central system. Over time the 
OBUs buffer the toll data generated while driving on 
toll roads (see figure 5), the total amount of toll data 
buffered increases linearly over time with different 
rates on weekdays and weekends. Of course, once the 
 
 
Figure 4: The simulation runs include an 
offline period of the toll data server with a 
duration of 1 to 10 consecutive days. 
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Figure 5: The toll data buffered by the OBUs 
increases proportionally over time while the 
receiving toll data server is offline. Choosing 
a small buffer size leads to an exhaustion 
(blue line), a larger buffer (red, green) is 
sufficient for this example. 
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buffer on a given OBU is exhausted, it can no longer 
participate in the automatic toll system: In figure 5 the 
blue line gives the results for a simulation setup where 
the buffer size is insufficient for long outages. In 
comparison to buffer size twice or four times as large 
the total amount of toll data buffered across the whole 
fleet starts to drop off after five days while the number 
of OBUs signaling a full buffer increases (not shown in 
figure 5). At that time some of the most active HGVs 
covered so many kilometers on toll roads that the 
buffer is completely full. As time progresses more and 
more HGVs reach this level. Doubling the buffer size 
is already sufficient in our scenarios to ensure that 
almost all OBUs remain in-service over the 10-day 
offline period. 
Taking the users’ point-of-view it is important to 
note that the driving patterns of individual HGVs differ 
drastically. Almost 10% are either powered off or 
outside of Germany over long periods of time – 
buffering toll data is obviously not a concern for these 
OBUs. Considering the active HGVs the activity 
follows of course a strong daily and weekly pattern 
(see e.g. [4]). To determine the buffer size needed to 
mitigate a given duration of server unavailability we 
depend on the total amount of toll data gathered by a 
given OBU over time. The example uses a 10-day 
period (including two weekends and two days of public 
holidays) to be buffered by the OBUs – most OBUs 
cope easily with the outage even when using a small 
buffer (as shown in figure 5). The most active users 
quickly exhaust the available buffer space in the first 
simulation scenario (relative buffer size “1” in figure 
6) leading to a sizable portion of the OBU fleet being 
out-of-service after the 10-day offline-period. It is 
interesting to note the “saturation” of the buffer across 
the OBU fleet: The second Monday, i.e. the final day 
of the offline period, leads to a sudden increase of 
OBUs out-of-service by about 4 percentage points – 
the ‘average’ driving patterns apparently begin to 
exhaust the buffer after 9 days. 
Increasing the buffer size on the OBUs quickly 
improves the simulation results (see figure 6). Even a 
20% increase in buffer size almost halves the number 
of OBUs out-of-service after 10 days. Quadrupling the 
buffer size suffices for almost all driving patterns. Yet 
some OBUs are very active on toll roads and will still 
exhaust the buffer. To pinpoint this behavior we look 
at the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the 
amount of toll data generated by an OBU over one 
week (figure 7, the x-axis gives the toll data in 
arbitrary units). Over the course of a week most HGVs 
drive only a moderate distance on toll roads (the 
median in figure 7 is close to „1“). However, some 
HGVs are considerably more active – the CDF is 
shown up to “5” units of toll data collected and still 
includes only 99,18% of the OBUs in the real-world or 
99,38% in the simulation. 
Comparing the weekly HGV activity as generated 
in the driving patterns simulation model (red line, 
figure 7) with the real-world data (blue line) we note 
that the driving patterns used in the simulation run 
deviate noticeably: In reality HGVs generate less toll 
data than in the simulation. In that way the simulation 
paints a pessimistic picture of the percentage of OBUs 
exhausting their buffer space. However, future work is 
needed to improve the match between the simulated 
and real-world driving patterns. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of OBUs whose toll 
data buffer is exhausted. 6 simulation results 
for buffer sizes differing by a factor of 4 are 
shown. 
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Figure 7: CDF of the toll data collected per 
OBU over one week as used in the 
simulation (red line) compared to the real-
world driving patterns (blue line). 
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 4.2 resuming operations 
 
When the server receiving the toll data resumes 
operation, in our example in the night between Monday 
and Tuesday after being offline for 10 days, the OBUs 
quickly reconnect and transmit the buffered toll data. 
Depending on the retry-mechanism OBUs try to reach 
the central system periodically with a decreasing 
frequency so as to avoid any overload situation due to 
retries. Within the first hours after the toll data server 
resumes operations most OBUs have completely 
transmitted their buffered toll data (see the quick fall-
off in figures 5 and 6) – if the OBU is powered on and 
within Germany. Looking at the overall amount of toll 
data residing on the OBU fleet (figure 5) even several 
days later almost 5 times as many toll data remain 
throughout the OBU fleet than prior to the offline 
period. In turn the risk of losing toll data (e.g. if the 
OBU is destroyed or the HGVs owner files for 
bankruptcy) is proportionally higher. The cost of 
delayed processing is therefore at least the sum of 
financing the delay and writing off unrecoverable tolls. 
All simulation runs show that the server load at the 
toll data server remains similar to normal operating 
conditions even when more toll data is transmitted. To 
gauge the sensitivity of the simulation runs to the 
server capacity we added one additional scenario 
where the number of parallel connections is limited to 
1/3 of the typical daily peak load. Even then the off-
peak hours suffice to return to normal operations with 
only marginal side-effects. 
This work emphasizes the availability of an 
automatic system and we have shown that end-to-end 
availability can be assured even if some parts are 
offline for considerable periods of time. However, one 
aspect should not be forgotten: [3] mentions reliability 
as one aspect, i.e. the “continuity of correct service” – 
in our case the overall detection quota (typically on a 
level close to 99.9% [17]). Even when we have shown, 
that the service can resume with almost no impact on 
users – it did in all scenarios put the OBUs of at least 
the most active HGVs out-of-service. While these 
users are still able to log-on manually, the question is 
open, at what level of impact the system can still be 
considered to render a “correct service”. 
 
5. Limitations  
 
Dealing with simulations and statistics is in itself a 
limitation – neither part is perfect and it may not be 
possible to verify the model with real-world data. 
Returning to the CDF of the weekly HGV activity we 
ask whether there is a chance to encounter ‘black 
swan’ statistics [16]? In some systems – most notably 
safety-critical systems – even a single extreme event 
must be considered. In our example the impact on a 
single user is at most the need to switch to manual log-
on or the loss of toll data. What could be the statistical 
outliers in our case? 0.8% of the OBUs collect more 
tolls in a week than the maximum value shown in 
figure 6. This compares to 0.6% as generated by the 
model of the user behavior used in the simulation runs. 
In both cases the most active OBUs create about twice 
as much data as chosen as cut-off in figure 6. Even 
with the largest buffer used in our simulation runs 
about 1 in 500 OBUs will be out-of-service as it fills its 
buffer completely.  
The knowledge on the real-world statistics is 
limited to an analysis of a time period of several 
months since any older data is and must be deleted. 
Looking at the maximum daily toll generated by OBUs 
we see that OBUs can be much more active: A single 
day suffices to reach well beyond the median of the 
weekly activity seen in the OBU fleet. If this behavior 
became the norm even the largest buffer used in our 
scenarios would fill up within days. 
 
6. Summary  
 
Availability – one of the aspects making up a 
dependable system – is usually defined in terms of sub-
systems, e.g. a server or a network connection. Taking 
the example of the automatic German toll system we 
argue that availability in a machine-to-machine system 
should be defined end-to-end rather than at the 
component level. Using an existing simulation model 
we showed that a prolonged offline-period of a server 
can be mitigated through local buffering of toll data. 
Looking at the underlying statistical data we note that 
the generated data differs from the real-world 
observations, the simulation includes too many highly 
active OBUs. 
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